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Abstract: In this Editor’s column I apply some of the insights I got from Richard
Wollheim over the years, and from a recent Teams-chat with students in my class.
Most notably: the role of suitable prompting in aesthetic normativity. In a sense,
these insights help me understand this remark from Wittgenstein: ‘The existence of
the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems
which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by.’ (Philosophical
Investigations, 232e.)
1. Some time ago people would ask me what turned me into the philosophy
of art, and I would tell them the following anecdote. Once, when I was about
eight years old, I was in the same room with two of my brothers, five and
ten years older than I was. Wil adored Jimi Hendrix, as did I when I was
with him. Frank, the oldest, was not too fond of Jimi. Instead, he loved The
BeeGees, as I did too, when I was near him. This time, they got into a fight
over their musical preferences and I felt trapped, as they asked me what I
liked best. I felt like I would always betray one of them, whatever answer I
should give. So, wisely, I kept my mouth shut. Of course, one could also say
that I was a coward – for a long time I would have agreed. Not anymore.
I always thought of this episode as the one that introduced me to the
problem of aesthetic normativity: you must always be prepared to defend
your aesthetic preferences. Those who are not are either snobs or sentimental
in some other way. The anecdote answered the question I kept getting from
people who could not imagine someone to be interested in aesthetics or the
philosophy of the arts.
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I have come to think though that the anecdote made me frame the problem
wrongly as a social issue. Although I still think there are social aspects to
our debates on aesthetic matters, these debates are never about these social
issues – or better: they should not be about them. When they are, this is
a contingent, empirical matter. Aesthetic normativity is about hearing the
merit of the playing in the music, seeing the painter’s hand in the painting,
and so on: perceiving the maker in what they made, and in how they made
it. Artistic merit connects with the authenticity of noticing what artists did,
or do.
2. I was reminded of the anecdote by a chat discussion in a recent class on
individual style in painting.1 One student, let us call him Klaas, mentioned
that he could not follow our philosophical discussions about aesthetic norma-
tivity. Why discuss whether it might have been the cubist painter Picasso
who painted The Victory Boogie Woogie, rather than the abstract artist Piet
Mondriaan? What difference would it make for the painting as such?2 He
wanted to understand this.
I had projected The Victory Boogie Woogie on the screen to ask the stu-
dents to consider how their understanding of it would shift once they were
told – wrongly – that it was by Picasso, whose Guernica we had discussed in
an earlier meeting. I wanted the students to realise how the picture would
become harder to understand – to put it mildly – against the background of
Picasso’s œuvre as it is against Mondriaan’s. The œuvre and the individual
style of a painter prompt one to realised intentions in their works. They tell
us what to look for, and how to look for it. Klaas could not see any of this
make a difference to his aesthetic appreciation of The Victory Boogie Woo-
gie. Should he look differently on account of such external information? How
could that change what he should be seeing?3
3. Over the years I collected exemplary cases to illustrate philosophical
issues in my classes. One of these is a music-video from the 1970s of Fleetwood
Mac (the original band) performing Need your love so bad. They are not
actually performing. Instead, they make moves in the television studio to fit
the music that is being played from a record. Peter Green, the lead-guitarist,
re-enacts his own singing. And you can see, that, instead of thinking about
this woman whose love he needs so badly, his mind is with the timing of his
lip movements. You can clearly see this.
One could say that the performance is not leading us deeper into the song
and its contents, but, rather, away from it – to the studio where the recording
is taking place. It is a fake, a forgery: not art but something infringing on
its vulnerability. What we see in the video does not prompt us to aspects or
elements in the song that we hear. As a consequence, our appreciation of the
song is misdirected, thinned out, inauthentic. We are prompted away from
the beauty of the song.4
4. Another clip I show in my classes is one I took from the Rolling Stones
film Gimme Shelter (1970, Albert and David Maysles). We see the band
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sitting in the studio, tired, listening to Wild Horses, a song they had been
recording. In the central plan séquence, filmed with a hand-held camera, we
see Keith Richards listening, eyes closed, mouthing the text, and appreciating
what he is hearing; then, via Mick Jagger, Charlie Watts noticing his drum-
ming attentively (though he is slightly distracted by the camera); followed by
Jagger, again, who is clearly happy with the result (and with being filmed).
We see how they listen to their own playing – enjoying it and physically re-
sponding to the sounds. We see them listening just like we do. Only, they
know exactly how to listen to the musicians in the music. They prompt us
to it, authentically, and suitably.
5. Wollheim argues that a work of art, if it is in an artist’s individual style,
realises the artist’s intentions. Above, I have been assuming this view when
saying that we are out to hear the musician in the music, see the painter in
the painting. And the two music-videos were meant to bring that point home.
It is true, however, that, through the many ways in which people appre-
ciate works of art, the meaning and artistic merit of these works may grow
on us in particular ways. A curator might think that it is the exhibition’s
function to prompt, or even steer an audience’s appreciation, and that the
resultant experiences is what counts as its success, rather than a faithfulness
concerning the work. Ideally, both fall into place with each other.5
Such a view though risks watering down the notion of aesthetic normativ-
ity.6 Another way to understand the role of a work’s exhibition is by assuming
that the artist made the work to be seen in a certain way, and that ever since
its first exhibition we are prompted to its aesthetic aspects and qualities. In
my view, Wollheim sums up incisively what is at stake here:
‘The central question to be asked of criticism is, What does it do?
How is a piece of criticism to be assessed, and what determines
whether it is adequate? To my mind the best brief answer . . . is,
Criticism is retrieval. The task of criticism is the reconstruction
of the creative process, where the creative process must in turn
be thought of as something not stopping short of, but terminating
on, the work of art itself. The creative process reconstructed, or
retrieval complete, the work is then open to understanding.’7
6. Perhaps, the retrieval may never be complete. But what would that
mean, exactly? Are we mistaken in expecting to reach a complete retrieval
– because we are unable to turn our insights into propositions that state
objective facts that can be verified and proven in the work? Retrieval is not
supposed to lead to objective truths, but to aesthetic, i.e. subjective ones.8 Of
course, the retrieval may also fail in certain cases, for instance, when the work
has little artistic merit.9 We may be nearing the work (which was already
finished by the artist), or moving away from it when a certain fashion turns
us in a wrong direction, and may later return to the work, or may have lost
all hope of ever grasping the work because we keep looking for the wrong
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things. ‘Wrong’, because they were not intended, and are not really visible
in the work, no matter how hard we think we can see them.
I also follow Wollheim in his view that the intentions that an artist realises
in their work may have been unconscious. What characterises them is their
visibility in the work. Wittgenstein, too, seems less interested in the life of
intentions in a person’s mind, than in how they surface in the person’s actions
– or works, I add.
‘Do not ask yourself “How does it work with me?” – Ask “What
do I know about someone else?”.’10
7. What I took from Wollheim’s quote on retrieval and from the one
coming next – apart from understanding that the suitability of our responses
is what aesthetic normativity is all about – is the openness that we should
entertain towards other people’s prompts. Whatever something or someone
prompts you to derives its suitability from the fact that in its wake you can
actually see the work that way. Time and again you may mistake people’s
prompts for suitable ones if you merely want to see the work as these people
suggest (even though you cannot really see it that way). Realising your
mistake may take ages – though, probably, it won’t. Seeing the work and the
intentions it realises requires ongoing authenticity on our behalf as well.
‘A suitable spectator is a spectator who is suitably sensitive, suit-
ably informed, and, if necessary, suitably prompted.’11
8. My two brothers – in the anecdote above – taught me how to hear
the artistic merit in Jimi’s guitar playing, as well as the compositional merit
of the songs the BeeGees performed – as well as recognising how different
these merits are. Unfortunately, at the time, my brothers were not open to
each other’s prompts, which obviously (at least, to me this is obvious) had
its grounds in their brotherly quarrels which simply overruled the aesthetic
openness required. Aesthetic normativity does not straightforwardly sustain
social relations, but our social relations may make us benevolently see the art
in different ways. However, as the anecdote illustrates, they may also hinder
such openness. And Wollheim says it again in another quote in his ‘Criticism
as Retrieval’.
‘Pictorial meaning, I have been claiming, always rests upon the
state of mind of the artist, and the way it leads him to work,
and the product that the work brings about in the mind of the
suitably informed and sensitive spectator.’12
So it is okay that people anywhere in the art world struggle over works of
art but whatever they want others to recognise about some work ought to be
noticeable in the work lest the prompts are unsuitable. All this goes to show
how difficult and lively aesthetic normativity is in practice.
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9. Now, what is the aim of empirical aesthetics? Is it to solve aesthetic
normativity – as if that needs solving – by zooming out and producing a
set of objective claims and their statistical occurrence? Or is it the effort to
subtract certain prompts, and the percentage with which they occur among
people (who are not necessarily interested in aesthetic or art historical debates
but who nevertheless know how to look at things and have thoughts about
them)? In the first sense aesthetic normativity is suggested to be replaceable
by reasoning, whereas in the second the prompts, more modestly, are put
before us inviting us to assess their suitability for ourselves.
The suitability of prompts cannot be assessed objectively (though their
unsuitably can be so assessed) – that is exactly the point of the notion of
aesthetic normativity. So . . .Without the search for the authenticity of the
art, the suitability of the prompting, and the authenticity of the appreciation
involved in what people say, empirical aesthetics sounds like a dead end.
What might be lost is of more consequence than we may think.
Aesthetic normativity is at the core of what it means to be human, I think.
Kant argued that aesthetic judgements is the foundation of our Geselligkeit,
because in them we share our subjectivity. Aesthetic normativity is where
people meet whilst in the process of perceiving the world. We do not converge
as easily, or intuitively in our knowledge claims, assumptions, preferences,
ethical principles, or social desires. Aesthetic normativity, in contrast, may
help us get over our cognitive stock, sometimes biased; it may get us to see
other people as persons, rather than merely as types or even objects.13
10. When the chat discussion I mentioned above surfaced in my course,
we had already discussed Wittgenstein’s remarks about aspect perception as
well as Wittgenstein’s suggestion that there might be people who are blind
to the dawning of an aspect. On that occasion, Klaas had told us that he
had been diagnosed as having Autism Spectrum Disorder. He suggested that
Wittgenstein might be thinking of autists with the ‘aspect-blind’, but he
also noted that he had no trouble switching from the duck to the hare in
the famous ambiguous image. Perhaps that illustrates why Wittgenstein is
talking about a technique here.14 If you concentrate on the eye and have it
look either to the left or to the right, either the duck or the hare will dawn
on you.15
But Wittgenstein also mentions, in this context of discussing aspect-
blindness, a harder conceptual issue:
One might say of someone that he was blind to the expression of
a face. Would his eyesight on that occasion be defective?
This is, of course, not simply a question for physiology. Here the
physiological is a symbol of the logical.16
Klaas remarked that he did have trouble understanding facial expressions,
as well. Some of the remarks Wittgenstein made about the recognition of
facial expressions did resonate with him. As said, he also could not grasp the
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relevance of an œuvre for the aesthetic appraisal of a work.17 Talking about
the incapacity to recognise what goes on in a face, Wittgenstein remarks ‘I do
not want to settle this.’ – one wonders why.18 I gather he backed away from
this issue because it is such an important – and complicated – philosophical
issue, and it lies at the core of what it means to be human.19
11. Perhaps then, aesthetic normativity is only for those among us who
do not have certain problems in the region of Autism Spectrum Disorder; for
those who can understand what goes on in another’s facial expression and
can converse about that; for those who can share the subjectivity of their
perceptions, as well as the perceiving of expression, generally. It would be
relevant for the majority of people.
Even so, this does not mean that the majority of people all know how to
deal with aesthetic normativity most profitably. Sometimes we simply stick
with a preference and ward off any prompts in other directions. I do not think
we can do without aesthetic education. Aesthetic education is the process
wherein we are taught that there is something like aesthetic normativity and
that one can get better at it over the years with whatever help one can get
from writings about arts and artists, and from aesthetic discussions with other
people about works and artists. And we must recognise how it is ‘something
not stopping short of, but terminating on, the work of art itself’. One has to
look for oneself and recognise what is happening.
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NOTES
1Which was based in large part on
Richard Wollheim 1993.
2The discussion was not about factual
matters; it was clear that it was Mondri-
aan who made the work.
3Wittgenstein’s discussion did concern
a kind of seeing that was permeable for
thought. Wollheim too, discusses this in
Wollheim 2001, 24: ‘. . . the central phe-
nomenological feature of seeing-in . . . is
its permeability to thought, whether the
thought is caused by the marked surface
or is prompted by another. And it is this
feature that in turn accounts for the wide
scope of seeing-in, wider, as we have seen
than that of seeing face-to-face. It is the
permeability of seeing-in to thought that
accounts for the wide range of things that
can be represented and for the wide range
of properties they can be represented as
having.’
4I realise that these synchronised
music-videos, recorded after the fact of
the music making in the television studio,
sometimes in front of an audience (present
to the re-enactment), were experienced at
the time as an advancement over merely
listening to a record. At least we could
now see the musicians. That slight advan-
tage came with a price.
5If we were to conclude, instead, that
it is not the artist but the reception of the
work that finishes it, we risk bringing the
work out of sight.
6As does Roland Barthes 1981.
7Wollheim 1980, 185.
8I know Wollheim would not put the
distinction in terms of an opposition be-
tween objective and subjective truths. But
the results of suitable prompting, and the
psychological reality of an artist’s individ-




9Either way, no outcome of the critical
retrieval will make us the ones who finish




13I know I am jumping ahead of my ar-
gument, and I won’t even return to this
thought now, but see Van Gerwen 2020.
14‘The substratum of this experience [of
aspect perception] is the mastery of a tech-
nique.’ Wittgenstein 1953, 208:e.
15‘what I perceive in the dawning of an
aspect is not a property of the object, but
an internal relation between it and other
objects.’ Wittgenstein 1953, 212:a.
16Wittgenstein 1953, 210e:a.
17‘Aspect-blindness will be akin to the
lack of a “musical ear”.’ Wittgenstein 1953,
214e:c. Not all must be lost for Klaas,
though. He loves the music of Led Zep-
pelin.
18Wittgenstein 1953, 213e:f.
19Empirical aesthetics seems to disagree
about the philosophical nature of this is-
sue. Then again, so does many an empiri-
cal scientist. I am thinking of Paul Ekman
and Friesen 1978 and their ‘Facial Action
Coding System’, a set of pictures of parts
of faces that supposedly constitute partic-
ular facial expressions. As though some-
one who is aspect-blind could reason their
way out of their incapacity. Even though
this might, time and again, fool someone.
For those who don’t understand what I
mean, this is an inclusive argument.
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